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CHAPTER 3
In Defense of Revenge
William Ian Miller
One of the risks of studying the Icelandic sagas and loving them,is, precisely, loving them. And what is one loving when oneloves them? The wit, the entertainment provided by perfectly told
tales? And just how are these entertaining tales and this wit separable
from their substance: honor, revenge, individual assertion, and yes, some
softer values, too, like peacefulness and prudence? Yet one suspects, and
quite rightly, that the softer values are secondary and utterly dependent
on being responsive to the problems engendered by the rougher values
of honor and vengeance. Is it possible to study the sagas and not be at-
tracted to the nobility, the dignity, the heroism of an ethic of "face,"
not to thrill to revenge and the open admission that it is the most satis-
fying way to reestablish the moral, if not the social, order after a wrong
has been done? The risk, it so happens, is in coming to love their way as
well as their way of talking about it.
Revenge, for us, is not a publicly admissible motive for individual ac-
tion.1 Church, state, and reason all counsel against it; as sin, as crime, or
as an irrationally backward-looking obsession with sunk costs. Officially
revenge is a bad thing, although collectivities are given greater leeway
than individuals in asserting it as a justification for action. The very polity
that will not allow its citizens to claim revenge as justification in its
courts of law sees nothing strange about telling its people that revenge
and honor are good reasons for invading another state. In sports, the de-
sire to pay back for past humiliations is thought to add to and not merely
to reproduce the motive of winning for the present and future.The big
difference between us and the denizens of the saga world is that revenge
was constitutive of much of their public, personal, and moral order. The
person who did not want to take it had to feel shame for not wanting to,
or at least had to come up with a plausible account as to why it was not
shameful for him not to seek revenge; this marks an obvious contrast
with us.
By the twelfth century in Iceland, Christianity helped provide a dis-
course for vengeance avoidance and helped legitimate a politics of for-
giveness.2 But even Christianity could not tolerate too much forgiveness.
It allowed revenge to God and kings in the same proportion that it in-
sisted on denying it to average mortals.3 A practical and somewhat legal-
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istic priest intent on revenge could finesse the matter by making use of
God's delight in revenge. Thus Gudmund Arason, concerned not to lose
his ordination should he kill the man he outlawed, but stricken with
anxiety at the prospect of dishonor for not killing him, offered God the
property he stood to gain from the case if God could contrive to get him
out of the dilemma that honor in its collision with honoring clerical vows
produced. God was obliging. He intervened to have the outlaw killed in
a general brawl in which Gudmund was in no way complicit.4 There
were ways of honorably avoiding the demand for revenge without invok-
ing Christianity. But these were only generally available to the honorable,
that is, to those who gave every impression of being willing and able to
take revenge the next time around.5 True, those who urged peace were
honored and appreciated, but most peacemakers were positioned as third
parties, not as people who were supposed to take revenge.6 The point,
however, is not that viable alternatives to revenge did not exist; it is
that the implementation of those options required work, a practical sense
of when and how to back off and back down, before others would believe
that forgoing revenge was an act of courageous self-denial rather than
cowardice.
Not so with us, at least as an official matter. Revenge has been removed
from the center of our practical lives and has been relocated to the fan-
tastic marches. Revenge is there, to be sure, via fantasy in movie and
via fantasy in foreign affairs. It has little legitimate public life in the
normal domain. Instead, among one repressed segment of us, revenges
go on inside as fantasies of getting even, of dominating, of discomfiting
those we envy, fantasies that are what Nietzsche supposed were the sub-
stance of ressentiment. And in another less repressed segment revenge
still thrives, but it is understood that that very thriving is the deter-
minative element in the ineffable vulgarity of young lower-class males.7
In our world revenge becomes either small-minded or vulgarly loud and
adolescent.
Officially we subscribe at some level to the evolutionary legal histor-
ical account of the nineteenth century that supposed that natural selec-
tion preferred compensation payment to blood revenge and then state
bureaucratic law to compensation. By this account revenge died simply
because it was obsolete and nonadaptive. We are also heirs to a compet-
ing account generated by contractarian political theory. Like the legal-
historical one, it supposes a vengeful world in times long past, but it de-
parts from the legal-historical model in seeing revenge not as disappearing
by some inevitable force of human progress, but rather as something that
must be continually overcome by acts of will, conscious political com-
mitment, and wise social planning. If for the legal historian the order-
threatening nature of honor and revenge doomed them by natural selec-
tion to extinction, then for Hobbes honor and revenge doomed humanity
unless one worked to devise institutions to suppress them; Hobbes knew
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that honor and glory are as much a temptation to us as they are a terror.
Both accounts agree, however, that it is better for civil society and the
rule of law that honor (and thus revenge) die a death.
So it did after a fashion. That is, the ruling elites officially gave up on
it, substituting reason and cost-benefit analysis instead. But if the upper
classes learned to walk away from fights with each other, the lower classes,
the medieval "meek," who by aristocratic ideology were denied the very
capacity for honor, kept it alive in barrooms and in back alleys; even the
children of the elite still cared about these things on the playground.
Unofficially, of course, the upper classes still cared to get even, held
grudges, and behaved like normally vengeful human beings, but their
revenges were transmuted and took place in economic arenas and muted
social activities like gossip and slighting rather than in face-to-face con-
frontation. Honor and revenge did not so much disappear as become vul-
gar and unfashionable, a source of embarrassment to the refined and civ-
ilized that needed to be glossed over and carried out in disguise, if carried
out at all.
At one level, the contrast between us and saga society is the differ-
ence between a society in which revenge is a publicly professable mo-
tive for action and one in which it is not. But the contrast, although in
some broad way defensible, ends by being subverted by the thinness of
the notion of revenge that is put on the table, either to be condemned
by moralists, rationalists, and political theorists or, with a somewhat
self-conscious sense of perversity, to be welcomed by romantics as the
substance of gothic fantasy. Romantics tend to underestimate the degree
of rationality, pragmatics, and cold calculation that motivated a lot of
honorable and vengeful action. One always suspects that many roman-
tics, for all their fascination with violence, are rather often strangers to
blood, pain, and the smells of death. The sagas, as any reader of them
knows, are only occasionally romantic in sensibility. They share with
the best heroic literature the ability to articulate and sustain powerful
critiques of feud, revenge, and honor. The heroic world is not simply
one of joy at the recovery of honor and Schadenfreude for the shame of
one's adversary. That world is also painfully aware of the costs, social
and individual, of honorable self-assertion. In our world the story is not
just one of the triumph of reason, law, and gentle socialization, either.
Despite the antihonor discourse and pretense that revenge is inimical to
a just legal order, we still feel at some visceral level that the world of
honor and revenge is nobler than ours, and it still remains for us grand and
frightfully alluring. We might suspect that when God claimed vengeance
to himself—"Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord"—he was not taking
upon himself a burden but rather selfishly reserving to himself a plea-
sure too good to share with mere mortals. It was because revenge was so
alluring that barriers of sinfulness, criminality, and other forms of tax-
ing it were felt to be necessary. When, after all, was the last time some-
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one decided to make sin and crime out of something that has no allure
at all?
Adherents to the ideology of the rule of law cannot disguise their hor-
ror and contempt at the rudeness and physicality of honor-based action
(and their pleasure in a social order that allows people like themselves
to occupy positions of prestige). And in revenge they connive to construct
a notion of revenge that trivializes it. Revenge is thus distinguished from
retribution by moral, legal, and political philosophers. Retribution can
still be mentioned in polite company and only with minor apology of-
fered as a respectable reason for punishment of wrongs, administered as
it must be by the state in a controlled, proportional fashion. Revenge, in
contrast, is portrayed as crazed, uncontrolled, subjective, individual, ad-
mitting no reason, no rule of limitation. It is conceived of not only as
lawless, but as unruled and ruleless. Revenge, so understood, is anath-
ema to the rule of law, but a source of fascination for the romantic.
Criminal law books quote passages like this: "Vengeance is self-serving
since it is arbitrarily (by its own authority) taken by anyone who feels
injured and wishes to retaliate. Vengeance is not defined by preexisting
rules nor proportioned to the injury avenged." These observations come
from a dedicated proponent of capital punishment anxious to deny that
capital punishment is merely revenge.8 Consider how Robert Nozick dis-
tinguishes revenge from retribution, turning revenge by definitional fiat
into a pathology rather than a behavior upon which many societies we
still think of as rather glorious based their moral and social order. (I take
his distinction here as representative of the general antirevenge tradition
of political, moral, and legal philosophy):
1. Revenge is for an injury; retribution for a wrong.
2. Retribution sets an internal limit to the amount of the punishment
according to the seriousness of the wrong; revenge need not.
3. Revenge is personal; the agent of retribution need have no special
or personal tie to the victim of the wrong for which he exacts retri-
bution.
4. Revenge involves a particular emotional tone, pleasure in the suffer-
ing of another, while retribution need involve no emotional tone.
5. There need be no generality in revenge. Not only is the avenger
not committed to revenging any similar act done to anyone, he is not
committed to avenging all done to himself.9
Some might wonder whether we only gain by preferring retribution
to revenge, even with revenge so unfavorably defined. We might wonder
whether a serious commitment to restoring the victim's dignity, rather
than worrying only about how the victimizer might not be deprived of
his, might lead us to prefer revenge to retribution in point 3. As to point
4, what do we suppose retribution without the accompaniment of emo-
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tions, such as a sense of duty, indignation, disapproval, or outrage, would
look like? How could retribution possibly be justified without an emo-
tional accompaniment? Unemotional bureaucratic implementation of
punishment looks much like law according to Kafka. Nozick's problem
more correctly must not be with emotions in general as with particular
emotions, namely Schadenfreude. (One might reasonably wonder whether
Schadenfreude is in some real sense a necessary feature of corrective
justice). Point 5 prefers generality in the application of sanction; there is
much to recommend this position, but it conies at a cost: it rejects mercy
in favor of dreary bureaucratic uniformity. Let's put all this aside as rais-
ing issues both too complex and too divisive for quick disposition. What
is clear is that revenge in the eyes of this tradition is merely a stand-in
for anarchy and anomie. It is an uninteresting straw man. Of course no
one wants to live around people carrying out revenge without measure
for any imagined slight. Honor-based vengeance cultures found such peo-
ple no less troublesome than bureaucratized societies fear them likely
to be. And honor cultures knew how to handle such misfits with more
than a slap on the wrist. The Norse called them berserks or ojafnadar-
menn (men of no measure) and usually found ways of disposing of them.
We might certainly want to historicize the notion of revenge; we would
want to see if it means one thing in a culture in which it is valued, a
culture openly committed to the norms of honor and "face," and another
when it is consciously relegated to the status of "that which must be
suppressed and overcome." In an honor-based culture we might suspect
that revenge will be richly embedded in a complex normative structure
that regulates it, cabins and constrains it, so that any meaningful dis-
tinction between retribution and revenge disappears.
The Icelandic legal order had an intimate relation with revenge.10 Ice-
landic law understood itself as providing an arena in which a modified
form of revenge could take place. Iceland had no state authority, no real
lordship; the responsibility for righting wrongs was the wronged person's.
He sued and he enforced the judgment unless he assigned his action, in
which case the responsibility devolved upon the assignee. The law did
not issue money judgments in disputes involving injuries or killing. The
penalty was outlawry, which allowed anyone to kill the outlaw with im-
punity and obliged the judgment holder to do so. This was very close to
revenge pure and simple. But it was a constraint on pure feud, a rather
big one. One could only sue someone who had engaged in culpable con-
duct, whereas in feud, one could kill the kin of the actual wrongdoer.
The law limited the range of possible revenge targets, and it compensated
for this restriction in a strange way. Suppose Thorgrim and six others at-
tack and kill Bjorn. Bjorn's brother can outlaw all seven of the assailants,
who can then be killed as outlaws. If Bjorn simply takes revenge, he will
be thought to be acting without measure if he takes more than a life or
two, depending finally on how worthy his vengeance targets turn out to
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be: the more worthy your victims the fewer you need to kill to complete
your vengeance.11 The law, in other words, contemplated more corpses
than feuding norms. In some respects feuding norms, in fact, supplied
restraint to the law. Seldom do we see all those who engaged in conduct
making them liable for outlawry actually get outlawed, or if outlawed
actually get hunted down and killed.12 Compromises and arbitrated set-
tlements were usually worked out. Those who went to law recognized
the more limiting constraints of feuding norms by rarely going after every-
one they had a claim against to the full extent of the law.
If outlawry looked not all that different from revenge killing, what
was the inducement to go to law? In either case one courted the danger
of hunting down dangerous men. The law, it seems, conferred practical
advantage by conferring moral advantage. Even in this stateless setting,
with enforcement up to the plaintiff, people cared about the law, held it
in reverence, and thought it mattered. Law accorded legitimacy to actions
whose legitimacy might otherwise be uncertain. Legitimacy had the ad-
vantage of inducing others to assist you in your endeavor and to desist
in aiding or abetting your outlaw. The law punished assisting an outlaw
with lesser outlawry (three years' exile and loss of property), and the sagas
show that the threat of prosecution was not a negligible deterrent.13 Hav-
ing the law with you, interestingly enough, also altered or even suspended
the rules of fair play. The law not only induced others to join your posse,
it made a posse look like the right thing to do. It was considered dishon-
orable for three to attack one in revenge, but foolish for a man to hunt
down his outlaw alone and not take advantage of numbers.14 And finally,
by going to law you made a public decision to limit your response to the
actual wrongdoers. No doubt this came as a nice relief to those innocent
kin of the wrongdoer who still might have been appropriate vengeance
targets had you decided to pursue that course. Such people might now
have a self-interested reason not to oppose you too aggressively in your
legal action against their kinsman. They surely had no great interest in
getting you to change your strategy from legal recourse to blood revenge.
By going to law you have let them off the hook.
If outlawry wasn't a sufficient concession to the blood urge, the law
allowed a limited right to kill as a kind of summary judgment. Simply
put, a man (and his companions) had a right to avenge assaults, injuries,
and killings in which he would be the plaintiff up to the time of the
next Allthing.15 Sometimes this right was limited to the place of the in-
cident; sometimes it was granted to the world at large for twenty-four
hours after the event. The right to kill was also given a man to avenge
sexual assaults or attempted sexual assaults on six women: wife, mother,
daughter, sister, foster daughter, and foster mother.16 The right to kill,
however, like a legal judgment, limited the class of expiators to those
who actually did the wrongful act.17 The law was thus willing to waive
its own obsession with procedure and admit that results were the im-
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portant thing. For our purposes, the point is that law can go a long way
toward countenancing revenge and still remain law. The wronged person
could kill now within limits, but he would have to prove later that he
had the right to kill. This, in fact, does not look all that different from
our rules of justification; it's only that these people had much broader
notions of what constituted justified killing. In this respect the law was
very much in touch with the values of honor.
Then there were feuding norms. Honorable people did not undertake
revenge lightly. Since revenge left not only you but your kin open to
reprisal, those kin had a genuine interest in your vengeance-taking de-
signs,- you might have to rein in your vengeful desires to accommodate
their interests. Feuding norms departed from legal rules in one key re-
spect. In feud, as indicated above, you were not required to kill the person
who had wronged you; his brother, cousin, uncle, son, father, or even
close friends could serve just as well. This principle of group liability
did much to constrain wild revenge. If you could get killed for your un-
cle's jokes or your cousin's womanizing, then you had a very keen interest
in your uncle's sense of humor and your cousin's sex life. You policed
those with whom the other side was likely to lump you. Revenge was
never properly an individual matter; people consulted with their kin and
friends before taking it, thus socializing the decision-making process. It
was not just up to the individual who felt himself wronged. Kin and oth-
ers would let you know if you were being supersensitive, and they would
goad you to do your duty if you were not being sensitive enough. What
they were concerned with was the appropriateness of your response, and
they were there to help you get it right. You also needed your kin and
friends for more than just advice. Most likely, you needed their help in
carrying out revenge, and you would surely need their aid when it was
your turn to be on the defensive. Above all, you needed the audience,
the public, the uninvolved, to recognize that you were behaving appro-
priately and not being supersensitive. For the uninvolved were the pos-
sible class of supporters of your enemy, and support him they would if
you were being asocial or merely self-assertive. If your cause was just,
you would have an easier time getting third-party support; if it wasn't,
it was easier for your enemy to get that support.
Feud, of course, was more than just doing the justice of avenging
wrongs. It was also a way of engaging in politics. To the extent that feud
looked back on past wrongs, it was judicial in its aspect; to the extent
that it looked forward to acquiring power, it was political. But in either
case it was subject to strong normative constraints. The feud and gen-
eral notions of propriety were governed by notions of balance and reci-
procity. Although the notion of balance is rich in ambiguity there were
still limits. If people didn't stay within them they attracted communal
hostility as well as legal liability.
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Right action, acting with right, means more than just acting in ac-
cord with substantive legal rules,- it also means acting properly when
doing right. Propriety inevitably brings us to the world of emotion, ges-
ture, and display. With regard to revenge, propriety is a matter not only of
selecting a proper target but also of proper timing and proper demeanor.
Three Norse proverbs give us rules of thumb: "Blood nights are the
hottest"; "Only a slave avenges himself immediately, but a coward never
does"; and "The longer vengeance is drawn out the more satisfying it
will be."18 One can begin plotting an emotional configuration of revenge
from these proverbs. Anger and the shame that generates anger are the
first things felt. The saga characters and the sagas themselves are rather
reticent about talking about inner mental states, but peoples' bodies give
them away. Characters turn red; they faint; they burst into tears or even
hysterical laughter; they swell and sweat. Grief, anger, rage, fury, and
shame surge, and the surge excuses, even justifies, hasty action. Blood
nights, it seems, extended no more than three days. We see one saga char-
acter thinking it wise to absent himself from a locality for three days af-
ter a killing.19 After that, it was unseemly to rush to vengeance. This
suggests that the emotional states that motivated seemly revenge were
in accord with cooler blood. Most revenge in the sagas is not the result
of irrational slashing back, but it would be equally wrong to think of it
as purely calculated instrumentality, although plenty of calculation un-
derscored a good portion of successful vengeance takings. Vengeance tak-
ing required planning. One needed support, one needed information about
one's target, one needed to consult about the advisability of whom to
hit and when. These were political matters as well as matters of honor.
The saga world, however, would not have recognized a distinction be-
tween honor and politics.
The psychology of revenge was a rather complex affair, and it would
misrepresent that complexity to situate it within any particular vengeance
taker. Revenge was only rarely an individual matter, and the different
members of the group consulted or assembled to undertake it would be
variously motivated. Some members of the grouping, usually young males,
would stay furious much longer than the period contemplated by blood
nights. Their role was to urge quick, aggressive, and often disproportion-
ate action. These in turn were restrained by older men and others re-
cruited who were less stricken by the death or insult that needed aveng-
ing but still felt the necessity and the propriety of vengeful action. For
these people vengeance is inseparable from a sense of determination, a
sense of duty, fueled at times by hatred, at times by a kind of malicious
delight in being able to terrorize one's opponent. Nonhasty revenge was
strategically wise practice. Not only did it give you the time to think
things through and get them right, it also was a period of wariness for the
possible class of victims who had to live with apprehension and anxiety.
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Within the complex of shame, anxiety, anger, and purposiveness that
motivates revenge,20 anxiety is more than the lot of the possible ven-
geance target. No small amount belonged to the vengeance takers, who,
despite the proverbial counsel about the deliciousness of slow revenge,
knew that between the act of shame done them and the taking of re-
venge for it was the period of dominance by their enemy, the period of
gossip about their shame and doubt about their capacity to avenge it.
This was the period of other people's pleasure in one's own pain. Such
knowledge about others' delights in one's own misfortune is not easy to
bear any time, but in an honor-based society it is truly not to be borne,
because the gossip of others and their delight constitutes the process by
which one's social rank is readjusted downward. Nothing is more painful,
nor more important.
If vengeance was mingled with politics, that is, with peoples' claim
for relative rank and domination, it was also mingled with grief and how
grief was properly displayed. Grief is an emotion that has points of sig-
nificant overlap with frustration. Nothing you can do can bring back the
object of grief. But it is precisely the frustration about the finality of
grief that propels a desire to do something, either as a vent for frustration,
or maybe, more magically, in hopes that action will bring some kind of
reversibility to nature. Grief, frustration, anger, hatred, and revenge are
elements in a kind of syndrome. This is not peculiar to Iceland. Grief,
rage, and head-hunting go hand in hand among the Ilongot;21 in Mac-
beth Malcolm can urge Macduff thus: "Let's make us med'cines of our
great revenge / To cure this deadly grief Let grief / Convert to anger,-
blunt not the heart, enrage it" (4.3.214-15, 228-29).
Is it by a cultural or linguistic fiction that we pretend to demarcate
certain emotions from one another? The oxymoron pays tribute to the
fact that we can experience contrary emotions at the same time, and al-
though no one would confuse joy with remorse, the notion of joyful re-
morse or remorseful joy is not inconceivable. Just how do we constitute
a pure grief that is not variously bound up with frustration, anger, venge-
fulness, or despair? We might suppose that there are different griefs appro-
priate to different cultures, and within cultures to different ages, statuses,
and genders. In the sagas, grief was manifested properly in old men by
their taking to bed, at times with exaggerated ritual display.22 For younger
men, grief went with rage and hatred or a grim sense of purpose.23 Women
were allowed tears, but these were often tears of rage. Women, more than
anyone, were supposed to be vengefully furious.24 It is of some note that
the Germanic word harm meant "grief" in Old Norse and both "grief"
and "an offense or injury" in Old English, and although harm lost the
sense of grief in Modern English, the semantic history of the word reveals
rather nicely the intimate association between grief and the occasion
for revenge.
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Whatever revenge was in saga Iceland it was not what the antihonor,
antirevenge discourses of political theory, moral philosophy, and utili-
tarianism wish to make it. It is constrained by norm, by law, and by a
firm sense of the emotional accompaniment that must attend it for it to
be properly motivated. Without "harm" or "shame," that is, without
wrongs and the proper attendant emotions, it was unwarranted. That is,
revenge had to be just and proper or it was simply another wrong that
needed to be avenged. Here is where the antirevenge tradition makes a
telling and practical point. How, they ask, do just revenges not engender
a counterrevenge? The innocent kin of the person who rightly dies at
the avenger's hand also will be rightly aggrieved. Won't they now have a
claim for blood? In fact the critique is not wrong, and the feud often
works precisely in that way. Moreover, wrongs don't simply arrive prein-
terpreted. What was laughed off at the time as a pleasantry among friends
could be later recalled and interpreted as an avengeable offense when re-
lations had soured. If the temporal frame of reference was extended too
far back in the past, virtually any presently aggressive behavior could
arguably be claimed as revenge for some long-forgotten wrong.
The trick is finding a principled way to understand when an action is
a justified reaction rather than simply an aggressive move. Icelandic law
attempted to solve the problem in such a way as to give avengers an in-
centive to take the route of getting an outlawry judgment and then killing
the culprit rather than doing it without legal confirmation. The law made
the killing of an outlaw privileged. Any revenge taken for the death of an
outlaw could not itself be legal.25 Killing someone in revenge before secur-
ing the judgment, no matter how rightful, subjected you to an outlawry
action brought by the corpse's kin. There you could raise the issue of the
justifiability of your action by way of defense. But these defenses were
not as wide-ranging in their coverage as the claims upon which you
could have had your enemy outlawed in the first place.25 Without the
intervention of the law, however, it was not unusual that a justifiable
revenge could give rise to an equally justified reprisal. If the law tried to put
an end to an infinite series of reprisals, it did so at the cost of frustration
of grieving kin and friends of the outlaw. They might still take revenge,
illegal now, but honor sometimes parted with the law, even in Iceland. In
fact, litigants recognized that if peace were to stand a chance, the grief of
people who had done no wrong would have to be assuaged and compen-
sated. As a result, most disputes of any seriousness tended not to end in
a legal judgment so much as in more informal settlements in which the
reasonable claims of grieving people could be taken into account. It is
thus quite common for someone who rightfully killed an attacker in legal
self-defense to compensate the attacker's kin for their loss.
Suppose the law has the capacity to worry and be annoyed. The Ice-
landic law, then, was less worried by the disorders of revenge than by
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the peace purchased by the compromise of outlawry claims. Settling out
of court annoyed the law. The law, as we have seen, was rather generous
in giving a right to kill, but was very stingy when it came to authorizing
settlement. In fact it purported to subject to lesser outlawry anyone who
settled any case involving killing or wounds without obtaining permis-
sion from the Allthing first.27 The sagas show no evidence that the rule
was anything more than wishful thinking, but it reveals a ranking of
concerns: it shows the law more jealous of its own prerogative than of
bringing peace. What do we make of this? It may simply evidence the
culture's view that of all the problems facing it, killing was not as im-
portant as subjecting all serious dispute to some official public scrutiny,
even if the cost of that scrutiny was greater loss of life. Or we may sim-
ply see it as an earlier instance of the sad tendency of institutions to
prefer their own power to the substantive matters that give them their
missions and justify their existence.
On that bleak note we move to the present to see how revenge fares in
our public fantasies and whether its style confirms the straw-man view
of revenge as mere self-assertion without order, mayhem without mea-
sure. We will examine the style of revenge and the character of the
avenger in that genre of film classically represented by Death Wish and
Dirty Harry and myriad others adopting their form. The modern revenge
film is characterized by a specific emotional economy that marks the
genre, in fact determines it. Emotion-based theories of narrative are as
old as Aristotle. Tragedy takes us through pity and fear to catharsis,- the
revenge narrative takes us from indignation and outrage at a wrong, via
fear and loathing of the wrongdoer, to a sense of satisfaction of having
the wrong righted on the body of the wrongdoer. The outrage and sense
of satisfaction are crucial and definitive of the genre, but along the way
from outrage to satisfaction we also expect to experience some mix of
apprehension, hopefulness, anxiety, despair, terror, disgust, and suspense.
These films are about justice, doing justice, with equal emphasis on
the doing and the justice. They are related to action and horror films,
but there are crucial differences that distinguish the genres. In the re-
venge genre the hero hunts down the wrongdoer; in action films the hero
tries to escape a wrongdoer intent on harming him or her. An action
film hero is the fugitive unjustly accused, or she, more likely, is the "fi-
nal girl" in various slasher films28 or big-budget action-horror films such
as the Alien and Terminator movies. These hunted heroes often become
avengers mostly as a matter of self-defense, but their situation is quite
different from that of classic avenging types like Dirty Harry or Charles
Bronson. The hero-as-hunted genre has a different emotional economy
from the vengeance film. The vengeance film, as we noted, depends on
indignation leading to a sense of satisfaction; in the hero-as-hunted it is
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apprehension and horror leading to the experience of relief. One is the
experience of escaping injustice, the other the experience of righting it.
Villains in the action-horror genre often pretend to a claim of right;
they style themselves as avengers in their own revenge dramas. This is
Max Cady in Cape Fear or the villains in Patriot Games. These are would-
be avengers who aspire to the status of avenger but who are not granted
it. We, the third-party observers, are the arbiters in this matter. And the
chief reason we do not grant them legitimacy is that we judge them to
be acting in accord with the straw-man model of revenge. They are not
reacting to wrongs, but either to punishments that they deserved or to
imagined insults. In the hero-as-hunted genre in which they find them-
selves their claims are recognizably without right, their methods of re-
venge pathologically disproportionate, and their motivation inappropri-
ate. They have idiosyncratic notions of their own right, and as a result
they do not engage us sympathetically. Look how thoroughly we reject
the straw-man conception of revenge constructed by political and moral
philosophers. We do not call Max Cady an avenger,- we do not even call
him an evil avenger. We simply call him a villain. We value the avenger
status too much to accord it promiscuously to anyone with some crazed
unconfirmed sense of his own wrong. The avenger status carries with it
right and legitimacy, and thus we confer it on those whose claims are
deserving. As in the saga world, revenge must be bound up with pub-
licly sustainable claims of right.
In the saga world honor and justice are inextricably linked to a notion
of reciprocity by a foundational metaphor based on debt, obligation, and
the exchange of gifts. A wrong, like a gift, must be repaid;29 not to repay
is to live in shame or to be forever lower than the person you owe. The
notion that the wronged person is a debtor means the wronged person is
obliged, has a duty, not just a right, to pay back. We too subscribe to
debt metaphors in our basic theories of corrective justice. As in the saga
world, we understand wrongs as obliging us to act, to pay back what we
owe, a most honorable commitment unfortunately vulgarized among us
in the idiom "payback time." But we talk rather loosely about paying
and paying back. We equally think of the wrongdoer as owing; he too is
a debtor. We thus speak of the villain as paying for his wrongs, as owing
a debt. Yet notice what happens when we make the wrongdoer a debtor:
we blur something that is rather clear when it is the victim who is the
debtor. When the victim is cast as debtor he knows to whom he owes
repayment; the wrongdoer is never quite clear to whom he owes his debt.
It's all rather fuzzy. He may be understood to owe the Furies, the gods,
the state, or society (only rarely is he thought to owe his victim). The
fuzziness, we see, is not just a matter of determining to whom among var-
ious claimants the wrongdoer owes his debt, but that the entity to whom
he owes the debt is not flesh and blood, but itself a fuzzy abstraction.
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The idea of the victim as debtor is completely consistent with an
ethic of honor and revenge. We should make that stronger: it seems to
be a necessary feature of honor and revenge. Nor is the idea of the wrong-
doer as debtor inconsistent with honor and revenge. It is surely possible
to understand the wrongdoer as paying for his wrong as he gets paid back
by the victim. Feuding societies were not above this confusion either,
since the wrongdoer often could negotiate an option of paying compen-
sation to buy off the avenger's ax. But the idea of wrongdoer as debtor is
also consistent with claims of a central authority interested in claiming
jurisdiction and asserting an overriding claim to people's claims against
each other in a way that the notion of the victim as debtor is not. Our
revenge genre mixes its metaphors. We have two types of avenging hero:
one who avenges outrages done to himself or to his loved ones; another
who is a kind of professional avenger, usually a renegade soldier or po-
lice officer. The former is Paul Kersey (Charles Bronson) in Death Wish;
the ideal model for the latter is Dirty Harry (Clint Eastwood). Roughly
speaking, one pays back; the other makes others pay. Bronson ultimately
becomes a generalized avenger doing justice where it needs to be done,
and Harry inevitably gets wronged in his own right by the villains he
hunts down. Still, without regard to the precise type of hero, the revenge
genre is attracted more to the model of wrongdoer as owing than victim
as owing. The sense of satisfaction it depends upon for its conclusion is
achieved more by seeing the victim get it than by seeing the avenger re-
claim lost honor. This only seems natural, given that the real victim is
usually dead (or a woman)30 and the avenger is operating as an agent or
surrogate for the original victim. These movies have strangely little to
do with the hero's honor reclamation, in spite of the genre's commit-
ment to a macho style,- they are more fantasies of effective state-deliv-
ered justice. Harry, after all, gets his right to do justice from being an
employee of the state.31
Films in the revenge genre derive additional force from their implicit
and at times explicit critique of the law. In their view, the law has lost
sight of justice. More concerned with its own internal coherence, the
law is depicted as preferring form to substance, and not just any form,
but form that always seems to favor wrongdoers over law-abiding citi-
zens. Thus Miranda warnings and the exclusionary rule are understood
to make a joke of a constitution now enlisted to the cause of villains
and criminals and forgetful of the claims of victims. Constitutional prin-
ciple and the rhetoric that maintains it become the rank muck from
which lawyers construct their tricks. This is a vision of law as either so
foolish as not to know when it has been had or so knavish as not to
care. Another critique, less virulent, takes this form: Even when the law
gets it right, gets the criminal and brings him to justice, that justice is
only second-best justice. The problem is that legal conclusions are never
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quite as satisfying as purely vengeful ones. The law promises closure
and gives us parole and probation instead; it locks up the rapist only to
release him to come back and kill the complaining witness.32 Revenge
accords more aesthetically with our sense of an ending; our fantasy is
that revenge provides true closure. Unlike the grimmer and more realis-
tic view of revenge in the saga world, the revenge genre gives us finality
by detaching the villain from anyone interested enough to avenge him
once he is killed.
The avenger, we see, must have right, and having right, he generally
works to assist a stricken, inept, or wayward law in doing justice. The
avenger does not view himself as providing a complete alternative sys-
tem to formal bureaucratic law. He views his role as interstitial. He comes
to remedy and complete the law, not to replace it. He has no problem
with the idea of legal rules when they deliver justice, with justice con-
ceived in terms of satisfying the rightful indignation of third parties against
predatory wrongdoers and remedying the harms of victims. He gets the
law to fulfill its central mission when legalism prevents it. Dirty Harry
does equity. He is not a law unto himself. He works where the law fails
to deliver justice. Like a chancellor, his right to intervene depends on
the law's getting a chance to get the right result; his actions are in every
sense derivative of the law, secondary, complementary, and equitable.
In fact, the idea of Harry would make no sense in a world of no law, for
what drives his style of heroism in particular is its implicit critique of
the legal system. He needs Miranda warnings, search-and-seizure rules,
the right against self-incrimination to have a purpose. Without such rules
(and with stiffer punishments), the genre suggests, the law would do just
fine and avengers would be out of work. And like the chancellor, he acts
upon the body of the wrongdoer or the person unjustly benefiting from
legal rules that are producing offensive, shocking, and unconscionable
results.33 The equity that motivates Harry does not deny the emotional
economy that drives justice. Rightful indignation demands to be com-
pensated with a sense of satisfaction. Harry would lose his moral force
(and box-office allure) if he could not satisfy this most moral of emotions.
The revenge that plays the straw man for various traditions of legal
and political theory is, as indicated above, by definition anarchical, un-
controlled, unprincipled, unbalanced. That is not a description of avengers
in the sagas or in our revenge films. As we noted earlier, only villains
are attracted to the straw-man model of revenge. They are the ones who
operate solely by their own inner light and against general norms of pro-
priety, right, and proportion. Consider, in contrast, just how constrained
and ruled the avenger is. He must, after all, do justice, and that is no
small constraint. And he is not the sole determiner of justice's demands,-
we are. It is we who determine whether he is hero or villain by how we
apportion right between him and his adversary. His actions must accord
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with our sense of justice or he is not a hero or the film is not a revenge
film. He must right wrongs and not just any wrongs, but ones we tend
to feel are inadequately remedied at law. Should his notion of wrong be-
come too expansive, he becomes a meddlesome bully or pathological in
the manner of Travis Bickle in Taxi Driver, for whom the mere existence
of others was an avengeable offense: "You talkin' to me?"
Notice the significant contrasts between the film avenger and his saga
counterpart. Unlike the saga avenger, the film hero cannot kill the inno-
cent father, son, or brother of the villain unless they too have commit-
ted avengeable offenses. Also unlike saga avengers, ours are inevitably
loners. This makes for a rather paradoxical contrast with the saga hero,
who is always deeply embedded within kin group and community. Para-
doxical because the saga hero ends up being more individualized for such
embedding than our avenger, who becomes almost indistinguishable from
his office. He is his role and nothing more, a pure avenger. The saga hero,
on the other hand, is only called to be an avenger two or three times in
his life; he must also manage his farm, be a father, brother, husband, ad-
viser, friend, and leader. For him, as a result, taking vengeance is a psy-
chological drama in a way that it is not for the film hero: the saga avenger
is more Hamlet than Harry. He thus ends up more individualized than
the film avenger, in spite of the traditional wisdom that denies the ca-
pacity for deep inner lives to denizens of honor cultures. Our avenger's
parody of romantic individualism rather weakly individuates him. He
postures as the most romantic of individuals, refusing to follow along
with the general level of incompetent docility that characterizes the bu-
reaucratic style, while at the same time molding himself seamlessly to
his ministerial function as a doer of justice. There is no office/person
distinction here because there is no person distinct from the office, just
a principle and a mission: a doer of justice.
I do not wish to overstate the case. The avenger has some strong ar-
eas of disagreement with the law. Here is a partial list:
1. Avengers will hear of no insanity defense for the nonpathetic insane,
that is, for those whose insanity makes them objects of fear and
loathing rather than of pity. In the same vein, notions of diminished
capacity that concede too much to determinist models of human
behavior are not acceptable. There is thus opposition to lessened
culpability or defenses for riot syndrome, junk food, Prozac, black
rage, posttraumatic stress (except for Vietnam vets) — even, I would
bet, for homosexual panic.
2. The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is service-
able mostly to rogues.
3. There is a general view that the law is too obsessed with wrongful
acts rather than with evil characters. Why not let juries hear evi-
84
In Defense of Revenge
dence of prior convictions and arrests, prior complaints, and so on?
That teeming assemblage of awful people who continually give of-
fense without ever committing any one particular offense that will
bring sufficiently appropriate legal sanction to bear upon them, such
as the bully and the pimp, are thus justified targets for the avenger.
4. As a corollary to the preceding, there is no presumption of inno-
cence for people who don't deserve it. The hostility to the presump-
tion of innocence is succinctly captured in Unforgiven by the tough
sheriff, Little Bill, when he is accused of having "just kicked the
shit out of an innocent man." Responds Bill: "Innocent? Innocent
of what?" Bill's mean wit changes the meaning of innocence to guilt
and makes it the condition to be accounted for, if not quite to be
proved. Moreover, Bill was right. The "innocent man" had violated
the town's firearms ordinance and had done so because he intended
to kill. Innocence in this genre is a true moral and social condition,
not a legal conclusion.
5. The criminal law's notions of proportionality do not accord with
the demands of justice. Not all first-degree and second-degree mur-
ders are worse than all rapes. The notion that rape could never be a
capital offense unless the victim is also killed is not an acceptable
ranking of wrongs, which ranking must depend not on the internal
coherence of the law, but on the sense of indignation and outrage
the act elicits in third parties.
These disagreements tend mostly in one direction: they all evidence a
belief that our law stacks the deck against justice by stacking it too much
in favor of wrongdoers. But they can be further broken down into sets
of rules designed to protect law-abiding citizens from an intrusive and
hostile state — such as search-and-seizure rules, the right against self-
incrimination—and rules that are concerned to prevent the horror of
punishing the innocent. The genre dismisses the first set as simply not
reflective of the real source of danger in contemporary society. It is not
the state but our fellow citizen who threatens our liberty. The second—
protecting the innocent — is disposed of by the formal demands of the
genre itself, which defines the problem away. The innocent are thus, by
definition, the victims of villains, not the victims of avengers. In this
genre the avenger never gets an innocent person. If he does he compro-
mises the form so drastically as to undo it. Avengers who kill the in-
nocent are vigilantes who, when banded together, are the villains in a
different and easily identified genre of which we may cite The Oxbow
Incident as an example. Notice I did not say that avengers do not get the
wrong man. It is just that the wrong man is never innocent. The genre
finesses this issue (in accordance with a popular sense of justice) by tak-
ing "innocent" to mean decent people minding their own business; inno-
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cence is emphatically not just having the fortune of being found legally
not guilty because of some juror's notion of reasonable doubt.
I have tried in this essay to show that the concept of revenge as articu-
lated in various antihonor discourses, whether they be moral, legal, or
political-philosophical, is not borne out by revenge and honor-based cul-
tures themselves. It is not unconstrained individual self-assertion in re-
sponse to injuries as defined by that individual. Nor is that view of re-
venge borne out by popular culture. Avengers in the sagas and avengers
in our films are both regulated by the audiences that observe them, pre-
cisely because both the saga hero and the modern avenger need the sup-
port of their audiences. For all the official handwringing over our delight
in depictions of revenge, those depictions — critical as they are about the
legal administration of justice, the leniency and uncertainty of punish-
ment, the lack of concern with victims and their satisfaction — are as a
matter of substance not all that opposed to the law. If popular culture's
rules for establishing who and what are eligible for expiation are some-
what broader, they are still quite narrow. The avenger's target still has
to have done wrong or harmed another. The avenger still has to convince
the neutral observer that he has right. In other words, there are rules,
very strict ones. The wild justice of revenge, for all its so-called wild-
ness, is strictly constrained by the fact that it is justice. The filmic form
in which this justice is portrayed depends on winning the support of view-
ers to the avenger's claims. We must be indignant, we must be outraged on
behalf of victims, and then be satisfied by justified payback. The avenger
cannot go it alone, inventing his own rules, his own theory of offense
and injury. If he does, he goes over the edge into psychopathology, and
then we are no longer seeing a classic revenge film.
If the avenger of American film and his saga counterpart share a richly
constrained and social notion of revenge, they are otherwise quite dif-
ferent. The saga hero is driven by shame and by fear of shame, which
are caught up and overlap variously with grief and anger. The avenger of
film seems unmotivated by a sense of shame. He is, however, angry, but
more often than not his anger is directed against his superiors or the au-
thorities who must bear the ultimate blame for the mayhem of villains
simply because they restrict him. In the saga world, justice and honor
were inseparable; the notion of honor and justice as reciprocity, as pay-
ing back what you owe, largely unified them both in a field of exchange
relations. The modern avenger has honor, but it is not that which moti-
vates him; it is the desire to make wrongdoers pay and in the process to
shame his superiors, who insist on making it so hard for him to make
wrongdoers pay. But it is not the superiors who owe us; it is still the
wrongdoers who do. They owe us for their acts of predation, for the harm
they cause, for the anxiety they instill. This is hardly the saga model of
restoring honor,- it is rather the suburban model of reducing risk to an
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insurable minimum. Finally, the saga form is too complex in the emo-
tional demands it makes on the reader to be reduced to a single genus;
not so the revenge film. Dirty Harry knows you will be outraged by the
wrongdoer, hate him for what he has done and who he is, and experience
the satisfaction of justice done when Harry makes your day by blowing
him away.
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